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Election fraud followed by the disproportionate use of 
force against peaceful protesters in Belarus strongly 
weakened the legitimacy of the country’s leader, A. 
Lukashenka, as the Belarusian people have shown their 
palpable desire for change. Reacting to the protests that 
arose after the August 2020 presidential election in 
Belarus, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy, Josep Borrell, stated: “The Belarusian 
population wants change, and wants it now. The EU 
stands by them” (EEAS 2020). Even if the outcome of this 
ongoing political crisis remains uncertain, it may have 
profound (geo)political consequences for the EU’s 
external action, altering security arrangements in Central 
Europe and affecting the Eastern Partnership (EaP). It is 
thus essential for the EU to re-consider its relations with 
Belarus in order to build a constructive and 
comprehensive approach towards Minsk.  
 
This policy brief discusses the current political crisis in 
Belarus and suggests ways policy-makers in the EU might 
respond to it. It begins with a clarification of the 
Belarusian unrest and the EU’s hesitant response. The 
brief then discusses the possible (geo)political 
repercussions of the crisis for the EU before considering 
various ways to address them. 
 
EU relations with Belarus 
In its relations with Belarus, the EU has always seemed 
rather reserved. An authoritarian regime closely allied 
with the Kremlin, Belarus under Lukashenka was viewed in 
Brussels as little more than a Russian satellite state. As a 
result, the EU’s engagement has been limited, favouring a 
stable, albeit not democratic, neighbour.  
Relations between Brussels and Minsk have been 
overshadowed by problems ever since Belarus fell into 
authoritarianism in the mid-1990s. Following the 1996 
unconstitutional referendum that significantly extended 
the powers of the Belarusian President, the ratification of 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was 
suspended in 1996 and no Action Plan has been adopted 
to date (EEAS 2016). Human rights violations, limited 
political contacts with the West and repeated election 
frauds have become ‘business-as-usual’ in the country.  
Executive Summary 
> The crisis in Belarus arising from the contested 
August 2020 presidential election is 
unprecedented: primarily internal, it has important 
repercussions for the region and the European 
Union. 
> Within the European Union, the crisis has altered 
the dynamics of the traditional division of labour. 
Despite a new leadership promise by Belarus’ 
neighbour Lithuania, the Union should generally 
focus more on speaking with one voice in this crisis.  
> From the regional perspective of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), the crisis has highlighted that the 
EU has to rethink its approach to the country, 
revitalize the multilateral dimension of the 
Partnership and further strengthen its cooperation 
with key cooperation partners, notably Ukraine. 
> From the general viewpoint of regional stability, the 
Belarus crisis could substantially alter security in 
Central Europe and cause its further militarisation. 
There is still a window of opportunity, however, 
that a national dialogue in Belarus could maintain 
the security-related status quo and possibly also re-
dynamise EU-Russia cooperation in their ‘shared 
neighbourhood’.  
> To ultimately deal with the consequences of the 
2020 elections, the EU needs to rethink its policies 
by enhancing humanitarian aid, retargeting political 
dialogue towards civil society, imposing targeted 
sanctions regarding Belarus and reinforcing its 
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As a result, the EU opted for a policy of ‘critical 
engagement’, limiting the bilateral dialogue to selective, 
mostly technical cooperation, for example within the 2008 
Framework Agreement on technical cooperation and 
through the 2020 visa facilitation agreement. In turn, 
Lukashenka gradually transformed the country into a 
Soviet-model authoritarian regime, presenting himself as 
the guarantor of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the EU. 
Paradoxically, however, the deterioration of his country’s 
relations with Brussels has made it even more dependent 
on the Kremlin, raising legitimate concerns about its 
sovereignty.  
The unprecedented nature of the 2020 crisis calls the 
rationale of the EU’s approach vis-à-vis Belarus into 
question. 
Uniqueness of the 2020 Belarus crisis 
The current turmoil in Belarus is unique for at least two 
reasons. First, the protests triggered by the 2020 
presidential election fraud and subsequent police 
brutality, have never been so massive, continuous and 
widespread across the entire country. They demonstrate 
profound changes in the Belarusian society, which is now 
prepared to express its utter dissatisfaction with the 
leadership in Minsk.  
Second, the public awakening in Belarus cannot be 
compared to Ukraine’s Maidan or the Armenian Velvet 
revolution. In contrast to Ukraine’s aspirations towards EU 
and NATO membership, the protesters in Belarus do not 
pursue any foreign policy goals. Instead, their demands are 
triggered by the most serious internal crisis of the regime 
resulting from discontent with its unprecedented 
brutality. Moreover, the geopolitical constellation of the 
Belarusian crisis is distinctive, too. Despite the strong 
economic bounds and military presence, Russia has 
neither the same security leverage over Belarus as over 
Armenia (due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), nor 
comparably strong geostrategic interests as in the case of 
Ukraine with respect to the Black Sea region (Kazharski 
and Makarychev 2020).  
These two aspects of the crisis point to opportunities for 
the EU to engage with Belarus: on the one hand, it could 
lend support to the democratic transition by engaging with 
the Belarusian civil society; on the other hand, there may 
be a greater opportunity to cooperate with Russia than in 
the cases of Ukraine or Armenia. 
The EU’s initial weak response to Belarusian turmoil  
If compared to its experience with the other countries of 
the Eastern Partnership, the EU has initially been rather 
prudent when it came to playing an active role (beyond 
rhetoric) in this new turmoil in its Eastern neighbourhood.  
This cautious approach can, first, be explained by the fears 
of escalating its conflict with Russia.  The EU is wary of 
turning this primarily domestic Belarusian crisis into 
another geopolitical contestation with the Kremlin by 
taking a more active stance. An engagement via the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) which has been accepted by Russia in other cases 
(such as in the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh or the 
‘5+2’ negotiations format on Transnistria), appears to be a 
more viable solution.  
However, the pressure not to neglect the neighbour is on, 
with the EU having already been accused of expressing 
insufficient solidarity with the Belarusians evidenced by 
more attention given to the fall-out of police brutality in 
the case of George Floyd’s death in the US than to 
democratic protests in its vicinity (Mielnik 2020, p. 158).  
Second, this apparent lack of interest on the part of the EU 
may stem from the current intra-EU political and 
institutional setting. Politicians from Poland, a traditional 
advocate of the Eastern cause, are hardly visible in the 
present division of labour, and the Commissioner 
responsible for neighbourhood comes from Hungary, a 
currently equally discredited country due to rule of law 
issues. By contrast, the most prominent positions, along 
with the Presidency of the Council, are held by individuals 
coming from the ‘old’ member states, often having 
different priorities than Central and Eastern European 
members. Warsaw’s attempts to call an extraordinary 
Foreign Affairs Council to discuss the situation in Belarus 
already on 10 August – the day after the elections – 
illustrate this: it succeeded only after complementing the 
agenda with items related to the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Mali, and resulted merely in the start of discussions 
over sanctions. 
An even more pronounced example of the neglect of the 
ongoing crisis by leading EU figures from Western Europe 
could be observed after the emergency video conference 
of the European Council on 19 August when the EU’s 
Internal Market Commissioner Breton claimed that 
“Belarus is not Europe, it is on the border of Europe” 
(Poland In, 2020) or when, on another occasion, the 
Spanish MEP Pineda accused the Belarusian opposition 
candidate, Tsikhanouskaya, of “looking for bloodbath” 
(Walsh 2020).  
In this cacophonic context, the evident leadership void 
was, somewhat unexpectedly, filled by Vilnius. It is in 
Lithuania that Tsikhanouskaya found refuge to continue 
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Belarus (Seimas of Lithuania 2020). Interestingly, this 
seems to suggest that the insights of a small, but credible 
country, may be more valued by the EU institutions and 
other member states than appeals of a member currently 
perceived as breaching the rule of law.  
Altogether, the intra-EU interest divergence and varying 
assessments of the gravity of situation constitute a 
powerful illustration of the EU’s weak position vis-à-vis its 
Eastern neighbours. It compels the Union to consolidate 
its efforts and speak with one voice. At the same time, the 
situation may also plead in favour of handing the 
leadership in dealing with the Belarus crisis to the OSCE.  
The fact that the Belarus crisis has also affected the 
dynamics on the regional level reinforces the need for a 
more coherent EU approach as well as the rationale for a 
stronger role for the OSCE. As the latter is composed of 
both Eastern and Western actors, and both Russia and 
Belarus are fully-fledged members of OSCE, a national 
dialogue under this umbrella might be a suitable way out 
of the crisis.  
The effects of the Belarus crisis on the Eastern 
Partnership: opportunities and risks 
Belarus has been of undeniable importance for the Eastern 
Partnership region both as a transit country for energy 
sources and as a host of the peace negotiations for the 
conflict in Donbas.  
A possible regime change could further enhance its 
cooperation with regional partners and revitalize the 
multilateral dimension of the EaP, enabling Minsk to join 
the club of like-minded states. This would not necessarily 
mean that the latter shall (or could) become an ambitious 
frontrunner and simply follow Georgian, Ukrainian or 
Moldovan paths leading to the conclusion of association 
agreements with the EU. Given its complex ties with 
Russia, the more foreseeable scenario for Minsk is to 
mimic Armenia and Azerbaijan, balancing pro-Russian and 
pro-Western sentiments and interests, and not aspiring to 
become a member of the EU. Due to the same strong bond 
with the Kremlin, however, any attempt of approximation 
with the West, even the most superficial one, may have 
negative geopolitical consequences.  
While there may be these prospects, the Belarusian crisis 
has so far contributed to a further decomposition of the 
EaP. Whereas the democratic movement in Belarus has 
found overwhelming support of Ukraine and Georgia, 
Armenia together with Azerbaijan and Moldova 
congratulated Lukashenka on his widely-questioned 
victory. Furthermore, where the current turmoil has 
scaled up support to the Belarusians by its neighbours at a 
societal level (also in Moldova and Armenia), in some cases 
it has further deteriorated relations at the highest political 
level.  
This dividing effect of the crisis does not diminish the value 
that the transition experience of the other EaP countries 
(in particular, Ukraine) may hold for Belarus. Kyiv’s 
ambition is to pursue the approximation with the EU to the 
largest possible extent and to extend the bilateral 
cooperation to new domains. The Belarusian turmoil may 
create a window of opportunity for Ukraine to tighten its 
cooperation with the EU, sharing the aim of supporting the 
neighbour and making Brussels perceive Kyiv as a strategic 
partner in the region, sharing its transition experience and 
having considerable geopolitical interests in settling the 
crisis. 
It is precisely this latter role Ukraine could play that 
Lukashenka tries to prevent in his attempt to stay in power 
and gain Russian support. This was illustrated on 11 
September when – in violation of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations – Belarusian custom officers 
searched the car of Ukrainian Ambassador to Belarus Kizim 
on the Belarus-Ukraine border. This shows that under 
Lukashenka Belarus is likely to further distance itself not 
only from the EU, but also from its non-EU neighbours, 
possibly rolling back onto the already slow progress. This 
distancing will primarily concern the neighbouring 
Ukraine, as Belarus will certainly fail to keep its role as a 
host of Ukraine talks when losing its ‘situational 
neutrality’. Additionally, Lukashenka’s ‘bargaining game’  
of trading off sovereignty to Russia for political support 
and subsidies poses a real risk of Belarus losing its 
sovereignty.  
The resultant elimination of Belarus as buffer zone 
between the EU and Russia may have important 
consequences for regional and European security. 
The Belarus crisis and the ‘Russian factor’: possible 
implications for regional security  
Russia plays an important role in EU-Belarus relations. The 
Kremlin perceives Belarus in terms of its policies towards 
its ‘near abroad’ (the ‘shared neighbourhood’, in the EU 
jargon). This has already been used by Lukashenka when 
trying to activate the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) to engage Russia in – what is so far – 
an internal crisis. For this purpose, Minsk has publicly 
denounced the threats coming from its neighbours Poland 
and Lithuania, both NATO members. 
So far, Russia has refused to talk to the Belarusian 
opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya and the Belarusian 
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democratisation and ‘Westernization’ of Belarus as well as 
a potential spread of the revolutionary mind-set to Russia 
make the Kremlin rather watchful. In contrast to European 
politicians who started to develop dialogue with the 
Belarusian opposition, Moscow has noticeably increased 
its contacts with Lukashenka’s regime, possibly expecting 
to make trade-offs as regards the deepening of the Union 
State of Russia and Belarus. This runs counter to the 
otherwise widening rift over political integration within 
the ‘Union State’ between Belarus and Russia, oil prices 
and trade disputes. These reinforced contacts have raised 
fears about the erosion of post-Soviet independence of 
Belarus.  
Such a scenario poses serious concerns in terms of a 
possible militarisation of Eastern Europe, altering the 
security context in Central Europe. Although Belarus under 
Lukashenka has remained more pro-Russian rather than a 
mere ‘buffer state’, as an independent country it has 
managed to provide security for Poland and Lithuania and 
to defend the Suwalki corridor linking the Russian exclave 
Kaliningrad with Belarus. A militarization of Belarus would 
thus eliminate the last area in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ 
that is free of direct EU-Russia confrontation and would 
further cut off the Baltic states. The EU’s apparent 
unwillingness to use its energy diplomacy and foreign and 
security policy more forcefully suggests that the 
international costs of such actions for Russia may be low. 
To maintain a security-related status quo in Eastern 
Europe, the EU must learn its lessons from the past and 
consider engaging in a dialogue with Moscow aimed at 
jointly handling the turmoil in the shared neighbourhood. 
While the minimum target should be cooperation to 
support a peaceful settlement of the ongoing crisis, in a 
very optimistic scenario one could even envisage the 
Belarus crisis as a stepping stone for building mutual trust 
and cooperation around regional security between the EU 
and Russia.  
Recommendations: the way forward for the EU 
While the Belarus crisis is primarily an internal conflict, the 
country occupies a strategic position that makes it 
important for both the EU (especially Central Europe) and 
Russia. Although a direct engagement of Brussels in the 
conflict may be undesirable and could cause significant 
geopolitical repercussions, the EU’s and its member states’ 
support for the unprecedented civic activism in Belarus is 
vital for maintaining European security and EU legitimacy 
in the region. Going forward, the EU’s approach should 
therefore rely centrally on three pillars. 
First, the EU’s current internal East-West divide and the 
limited role of the East risks marginalising the Belarus crisis 
as a topic and undermining the EU’s role in tackling it. The 
EU member states should therefore be called upon to 
sincerely cooperate on the elaboration of a strategy that 
goes beyond the (absence of) particular interests. This 
latter should include, but not be limited to, the imposition 
of targeted sanctions aimed at the Lukashenka regime 
which would give a strong signal of the EU’s united 
position. An assertive response by the EU could, for 
instance, consist of a refusal to buy electricity imports 
from the Astravets power plant in Belarus, the project that 
has already raised major concerns among the Central and 
Eastern European countries in terms of its safety.  
Furthermore, to effectively respond to the Belarus crisis, 
the EU needs to keep Russia in check. For this, the EU could 
intensify its energy diplomacy vis-à-vis Moscow in the 
framework of the Russian-backed Nord Stream 2. Given 
the poisoning of key Russian opposition leader Navalny 
and the situation in Belarus, the completion of this project 
would further embolden the increasingly aggressive 
foreign policy course of Putin’s Russia. 
Second, the enduring urge for freedom and democracy of 
the Belarusians should prompt the EU to develop an 
integrated approach to support victims of police brutality, 
promote dialogue with the Belarusian civil society and 
freedom of speech. In particular, this could be done by 
using EaP platforms and engaging the other Eastern 
Partnership countries, notably Ukraine, in exchanges of 
experience and good practices, further liberalising visa 
requirements and sending targeted aid.  
Third, the EU needs to advocate for OSCE mediation with 
a view to starting a dialogue on a democratic transition of 
power with the help of the Coordination Council of 
Belarus. In this respect it is crucial to engage with Russia 
by inviting the Kremlin to the negotiation table instead of 
waiting for it to take the lead.  
To conclude, while it is important, as HR/VP Borrell (Cué  
2020) stated, not “to turn Belarus into a second Ukraine”, 
the political crisis in the shared neighbourhood should not 
see distancing of the EU either. The current phase of the 
conflict provides some space for its peaceful resolution, 
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